Horns247 Board

Hey, I wasn't argueing one way or the other. I simply stated one advantage of bunting the lead off runner to second base. But since you've been a jerk, I'll say that you have no clue what the "reality" I supposedly ignored is comprised of. Does it only include runners on first with no outs, or does it include doubles, steals, runners on first with one out or two etc. There's a reason they say a runner on 2nd is in scoring position. Bunting the lead off runner to second is common in baseball, at all levels. The St Louis Cardinals have used it pretty successfully.

I suspect the stat the LHN provided skews the reality, whether by including men on second by a double or simply by the smallness of the sample. However, earlier in the thread, JerseyBornHorn provided a link to an article showing how bunting decreases a team's chance for scoring when it has a man on first and 0 outs.

A team might want to occasionally bunt to keep a defense on its toes. It might want to bunt late in a game to get a single run, depending on the player at the plate and the quality of the defense. I don't think any of us dispute that. We simply note how bunting as a rule is a bad strategy.

I tried to refrain from name calling, but you invite it so well, so I will merely say that I never quite understood until now the saying, "Logic is little tweeting bird chirping in meadow.".

Carry on, oh ye of jerklessness.

BTW, for another (though dated) study of the results of bunting in various situations, try the following which distills the information into a more compressed and readily accessed form.

http://academic.cengage.com/resource_uploads/downloads/0534094929_46534.pdf

It essentially argues that if we assume sacrifice bunts result in the players advancing the the batter being called out at first, then bunting with 0 out and a man on second is a good strategy late in a a game in which you need a single run and that bunting with 0 out and men on first and second is a good strategy nearly always.

However, it notes that the sacrifice isn't always successful. The batter can miss the pitch, pop up, bunt too hard and the lead runner thrown out, or the defense could mishandle it and the batter could be safe.

I'll let you find better stats on the likelihood of a hit, all runners being safe on a fielder's choice or error versus the likelihood of an out wasted without moving the runner or resulting in the elimination the lead runner.

Inning ending double play with nobody out......wow. Sounds like a great reason to bunt!

I only get two options? Sounds like a fair assessment

You keep saying this, but it's not true. I let it go once, but you seem to want to keep throwing it out there as fact, and that cannot go unchecked.

There are metrics and stats that suggest not punting in most 4th down situations is better for the WE (win expectancy), but none suggest punting the punt altogether. Some coaches rarely punt, and there are stories about them, but the metrics all call for punting in certain situations. So, please stop saying that. It's not correct and cannot be used to support a theory.

I said it one time.

Couldn't have said it better!

Wait, you prescribe to giving up outs against better pitching? Shortening the game for these pitchers.

I'm speaking of game when both teams have better pitching and the expected score per team is 2-3 rather than five. I'm going to do a little mental arithmetic. Runner on first. The OBP of the hitter against the pitcher he is facing is .400 plus. The chances of a successful sacrifice are .800. Then the chance of advancing the base runner by allowing the hitter to swing is 50% of a sacrifice. But when the slugging percentage is considered, with the chance of advancing the running two or three bases; then the relative advantage of the sacrifice drops even more. With a OPS of over .800, advantage swinging. Actually, I suspect that I'm exaggerating the percentage of successful sacrifices. Its probably 65-70, so a batters OPS of .700 is advantage hitter.

But if the hitter has an expected OBP of .200 and an OPS of .400against a pitcher; then the sacrifice has a three time advantage of advancing the runner into scoring position over allowing the batter to hit and an almost two time advantage in scoring the runner. The strategy is completely dependent on the OBP and OPS of the hitter against a given pitcher.

I've watched this over the years. During the pre-steroid days of the Koufax/Drysdale Dodgers and the Gibson Cardinals; teams who stole bases and successfully used the sacrifice were successful. That changed during the steroid days to a degree; but I think the rigid adherence to modern sabermetrics were the reason that Beane's Oakland teams were successful during the regular season when the quality of pitching wasn't very good. They lost in the post-season, when the quality of pitching increased , and their plodding base to base philosophy became a detriment.

Again, I have no data to back this up, but teleologically it makes sense. To answer Beast, we still aren't completely out of the steroid era, and certainly haven't been for long enough to fully examine the data. The NCAA only went to deadened aluminum bats in 2011 by my memory, so the data is still very incomplete. In my profession; bio-statics are the basis of our science. You have to see how well the data is controlled. I've already said that it makes much less sense to sacrifice with your #3-5 hitters than it does with the bottom of your order. Are your metrics controlled for batter OBP and OPS., and beyond that, expected OBP and OPS against a given pitcher. It needs to be to be statically valid.

You really have to have a team average around .290-.310 and multiple stolen base threats for small ball to be effective. Augie's 2000 team is a perfect example if this type of strategy working all the way to Omaha. That's really Augie's only team that made it to Omaha without a Top 10 pitching staff.

And then that team got destroyed in both their games in Omaha.

However the numbers just don't dictate it being a strategy to score crooked numbers very often, not too mention, letting a pitcher off the hook. So instead of throwing another 10-20 pitches for the course of the game, he throws a batting practice fastball and lets a hitter give himself up.